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Recent  withdrawals  of  a  large  number  of 
banks from the Federal  Reserve System  have 
focused  attention  on  the  importance  of  the 
reserve  requirements  imposed  by  the  Federal 
Reserve on member banks. ' Since withdrawal 
of  a  bank  from  the Federal  Reserve  System 
automatically makes it subject to state reserve 
requirements, these requirements are also 
important in  determining  whether  banks 
choose  to  belong  to  the  Federal  Reserve 
System.  Nonmember  banks  in  all  states  but 
Illinois  are  subject  to  reserve  requirements. 
However, state requirements are generally 
lower than those set by the Federal Reserve and 
allow  nonmember  banks  to hold  reserve 
balances  in  interest-earning  securities  or  in 
service-earning  deposits  with  correspondent 
banks. 
1 At  least 41 member banks have left the System in every 
year since 1968.  In 1977,  69  banks withdrew, the second 
highest  number on record, and 37 banks left in  the first 
half of 1978. Furthermore, while earlier  withdrawals were 
almost entirely by  very small banks, 15 of the banks with- 
drawing in 1977 had deposits of  more than $100 million. 
See  Board  of  Governors of  the  Federal  Reserve  System, 
"The  Burden  of  Federal  Reserve  Membership,  NOW 
Accounts, and the Payment of  Interest on Reserves," June 
1977; Robert E. Knight, "Comparative Burdens of Federal 
Reserve Member and Nonmember  Banks," Monthly 
Review, Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City, March 1977, 
pp. 3-28; and Peter S.  Rose, "Banker Attitudes Toward the 
Federal Reserve System: Survey Results," Journal of  Bank 
Research, 8 (Summer 19771, pp. 77-84. 
This  article  examines  the  role  of  reserve 
requirements on both Federal Reserve member 
and nonmember bank deposits, with particular 
attention  to  the  Tenth  Federal  Reserve 
District.= The first  section  considers  the 
purpose  and  importance  of  reserve  require- 
ments in general.  The  next section  compares 
the level of  member bank reserve requirements 
to the level of nonmember reserve requirements 
in the Tenth District states. Finally, evidence is 
examined  on  the  extent  that  state  reserve 
requirements affect the cash reserve holdings of 
nonmember banks. 
PURPOSE AND IMPORTANCE OF 
RESERVE REQUIREMENTS 
Three different roles for reserve requirements 
have  been  suggested.  One  role  of  reserve 
requirements,  it  originally was  thought,  is  to 
help ensure the liquidity and safety of  banks. 
Another  role,  it  is  contended,  is  that 
requirements serve as a tax on banks. However, 
contemporary analysts generally emphasize the 
role that reserve requirements play in facilita- 
ting monetary control. 
2 The Tenth District includes Colorado, Kansas, Nebraska, 
Wyoming, most of Oklahoma,  northern New  Mexico, and 
43 counties in western Missouri. 
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Liquidity and Safety 
Historically, the introduction of  reserve 
requirements was motivated by the belief that a 
bank's  required reserves would  provide liquid- 
ity  in the event  of  an  unexpected  oufflow  of 
deposits .and  would  protect  depositors  in  the 
event of the insolvency of the bank.'  However, 
under  the fractional  reserve  systems  used  by 
both  the  Federal  Reserve  and  the  states, 
required  reserves  do  not  contribute  much  to 
liquidity and safety. Suppose, for example, that 
a  state  imposed  a  10  per  cent  reserve 
requirement  on  demand  deposits.  A  $10 
deposit outflow  would  reduce  a  bank's  cash 
assets by  $10,  but only  $1 would  come  from 
required reserves. Thus, most of the liquidity to 
meet  the  oufflow  must  come  from  other 
sources.' 
Early  proponents  of  reserve  requirements 
also  believed  that  required  reserves  would 
provide protection to depositors in the event of 
insolvency.  This  belief  confuses  the  role  of 
capital-which  allows liabilities to be  met  in 
the event of  a decline in asset values-and that 
of reserves, which are simply one type of  asset. 
For  example, the only  default  protection 
provided by  a 10 per cent reserve requirement 
is a guarantee that the institution will have on 
hand  $1 for  every  $10  of  deposits.  Only  if 
required  cash  reserves  were  equal  to  100 
per cent of deposits would they protect deposi- 
tors. 
3 For a discussion of  pre-Civil War state reserve require- 
ments,  see  Bray  Hammond,  "Banking  Before  the  Civil 
War," pp.  1-14,  in  Deane  Carson,  ed.,  Banking  and 
Monetary Studies (Homewood, Ill.:  Irwin, 1963). 
Required  reserves  do  provide  liquidity  for  very  brief 
periods. The Federal Reserve and most states use a system 
of averaging reserves and deposits over a period of one or 
more weeks. Under this system, reserves can be used as a 
source of liquidity for a very brief period of  time, as long as 
the  reserve  requirements  are  met  on  average  over  the 
period. 
Thus,  cash  reserve  requirements  do  not 
contribute  much  to  bank  liquidity or  to  the 
protection of  depositors. Moreover, to the very 
limited extent that required reserves serve these 
functions, reserves could be held in the form of 
liquid  interest-bearing  assets,  so  that  cash 
requirements would be unneces~ary.~ 
Reserve Requirements as a "Tax" 
on Banks 
A further role of  reserve requirements,  it  is 
contended, is that they serve as a tax on banks. 
To the extent that member banks hold  higher 
levels of  noninterest-bearing reserve assets than 
they otherwise would, reserve requirements on 
member  banks are effectively  a  tax  on  these 
banks  that  provides  revenue  to  the  Federal 
G~vernment.~  The tax on banks is equal to the 
interest that would otherwise have been earned 
on  reserve  assets.  The  Government  revenue 
arises from the interest earned  by  the Federal 
Reserve  on  securities  acquired  to  support 
member bank reserves. Suppose, for example, 
the  Federal  Reserve  increased  bank  reserve 
requirements  but  did  not  want  to  induce  a 
change in the money supply. In this case, the 
System would  purchase securities in  the open 
5  The fact that required reserves do not serve as a source of 
liquidity in the event of a deposit oufflow has been widely 
recognized at least  since  the  beginning  of  this  century. 
Nevertheless, a  survey of  state banking  commissioners in 
1952  yielded  the  near  unanimous view  that  the  primary 
function of reserve requirements was to serve as a source of 
liquidity. Joint  Committee  on  the Economic  Report, 82d 
Cong.,  2d Sess.,  Monetary Policy and the  Management of 
the Public Debt, Replies to Questions and Other Material 
for the Use of the Subcommittee on General Credit Control 
and Debt Management (Washington: Government Printing 
m~ce,  1952), pp. 978-83. 
6 There is  an old  controversy as to whether  the  Federal 
Reserve  earns  interest  on  funds  deposited  with  it  by 
member  banks, or earns interest on  funds created  by  its 
own open  market operations.  The answer is clearly both, 
with the controversy being akin  to a  discussion of  which 
side of a pair of scissors cuts. 
Federal Reserve Bank  of  Kansas City market  to  provide  enough  new  reserves  to 
support  an  unchanged  level  of  deposits.  To 
meet the higher  requirements,  member  banks 
would  reduce their interest-earning assets and 
build up their noninterest-earning  reserve 
assets.'  The  final  result  would  be  higher 
earnings  for  the  Federal  Reserve  and  lower 
earnings for commercial banks. Since  Federal 
Reserve  profits  are  remitted  to  the  U.S. 
Treasury,  the  impact  of  higher  reserve 
requirements amounts  to increasing  taxes  on 
member banks. 
These "taxes" apply only to member banks. 
Reserve  requirements  applied  to  nonmember 
banks by the various states provide no revenue 
to state  treasuries  or  to  the  Federal  Govern- 
ment, with the minor exception of  a few states 
that require some fraction of reserves to be held 
in vault cash.O While state reserve requirements 
do not generate "tax" revenues, they may still 
be  burdensome  to nonmember  banks  to  the 
extent  that  banks  hold  more  reserves  than 
would otherwise be the case. However, because 
many of the reserve assets held by  nonmember 
banks provide a return either in interest income 
or in services, the burden is  generally less for 
nonmember banks than for member banks with 
the same level of reserve requirements. 
Reserve Requirements as a 
Monetary Policy Tool 
The primary purpose of reserve requirements 
imposed  on  member  banks  by  the  Federal 
Reserve  is to facilitate  monetary  control. 
Because  member  banks  must  hold  reserves 
behind deposits, the total quantity of deposits 
that can be issued is limited  by the supply of 
reserves  in  the  banking  system.  Thus,  the 
Federal  Reserve can influence the quantity of 
deposits and the money supply by changing the 
quantity  of  reserves,  normally  through  open 
market operations. 
The Federal  Reserve can  also  influence  the 
money supply by  changing the level  of  reserve 
requirements.  For  example,  an  increase  in 
reserve requirements will lead to a reduction in 
the total  volume of  deposits,  unless  the total 
quantity of  reserves is simultaneously increas- 
ed.  The  reduction  in  deposits  would  occur 
because the reserves available  in the banking 
system would  not be sufficient  to support the 
existing  level  of  deposits,  and  banks  would 
need  to  contract  their  size  until  the  reserve 
deficiency was eliminated. lo 
Some observers argue  that  reserve  require- 
ments are  not  important for  monetary  policy 
because  they  are infrequently  changed.  How- 
ever, the frequency with which reserve require- 
ments  are  changed  is  not  important for 
determining  whether  requirements  facilitate 
monetary control. Requirements facilitate con- 
trol if they make the relationship between the 
level of  deposits and the level of  bank reserves 
more  predictable  than  it  would  be  in  the 
absence  of  reserve  requirements.  However,  if 
banks  would  hold  predictable  quantities  of 
reserves in the absence of reserve requirements, 
7 For  a  discussion  of  reserve  requirements as taxes,  see 
William G.  Dewald,  "Liking Required Reserves  Reform 
to the Correspondent Banking System," in Proceedings of a 
Conference on  Bank  Structure  and  Competition,  Federal 
Reserve Bank of Chicago, April 27-28, 1978. 
The  essential  difference between member and nonmem- 
ber banks here is that member banks hold liabilities of the 
Federal  Reserve  which,  in  turn,  holds  interest-earning 
assets and turns the earnings over  to the  U.S. Treasury. 
Vault  cash  is  the  only  Federal  Reserve  liability  held  by 
nonmembers. 
J.  A.  Cacy,  "Reserve  Requirements  and  Monetary 
Control,"  Monthly  Review,  Federal  Reserve  Bank  of 
Kansas City (May 1976), pp. 3-13. 
Assuming that banks were not holding large amounts of 
excess reserves-that  is,  reserves  greater  than  needed  to 
meet  requirements-prior  to the  increase  in  reserve 
requirements. 
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monetary control. 
The  use  of  reserve  requirements  as  a 
monetary control device applies only to member 
banks.  Reserve  requirements  of  nonmember 
banks do not serve a  direct  monetary  control 
function because in  general state requirements 
can be met by holding assets that are not under 
the direct control of the Federal Resew-uch 
as  balances  at  other  banks  and  Government 
securities. 
Role of  State Reserve Requirements 
Of  the  three  listed  purposes  of  reserve 
requirements, two do not apply to state reserve 
requirements,  i.e.,  their  use  for  monetary 
control and their use as a bank tax. The third 
purposes source of liquidity and safety-is of 
minor  importance.  Thus, it  might  be  argued 
that state reserve  requirements  have  virtually 
no function. 
However,  state  reserve  requirements  may 
indirectly  play a  role  in  facilitating  monetary 
control.  If  state  requirements encourage 
membership  in  the  System,  they  strengthen 
monetary control because more members mean 
more deposits directly  subject  to Federal 
Reserve  control.  The  extent  to  which  state 
requirements  encourage  membership  depends 
importantly on two factors. One is the level of 
nonmember bank reserve requirements relative 
to  member  requirements.  The  other  is  the 
extent that these  requirements  are effective 
that  is,  whether  or  not  they  actually  induce 
banks to hold a higher level of cash assets than 
would otherwise be the case. The remainder of 
11 Reserve  requirements may  also  be  unnecessary  if  the 
Federal  Reserve relies on interest rates rather than bank 
reserves to control the money stock. See J.  A. Cacy, "The 
Impact  on  Monetary  Control  of  Reducing  Reserve 
Requirements," Working Paper, Federal Reserve  Bank  of 
Kansas City (forthcoming). 
this article will look at the level of  nonmember 
reserve  requirements  in  Tenth  District  states 
and examine  the evidence on the effectiveness 
of state reserve requirements. 
FEDERAL RESERVE AND TENTH 
DISTRICT RESERVE REQUIREMENTS: 
1962-78 
Both Federal Reserve and state cash  reserve 
requirements  have  been  lowered  in  recent 
years. State requirements,  however, have been 
lowered  more than System  requirements.  The 
relatively greater decline in state requirements 
has pushed  them  below  those imposed  by  the 
Federal  Reserve  and  has  reduced  the  extent 
that state  requirements  serve  the function  of 
encouraging  banks  to  become  and  remain 
members of the Federal Reserve System. 
The level of  state cash reserve requirements 
in the Tenth Federal Reserve District is shown 
in  Table  1.12 In  Colorado,  there are no cash 
reserve  requirements,  as  all  of  the  required 
reserves can be held in the form of securities. 
In Missouri,  Nebraska,  and New  Mexico,  the 
provision  in  state law  that allows one-half  of 
required  reserves  to  be  met  with  securities 
reduces  state  cash  reserve  requirements  to 
levels  somewhat  below  the  requirements  for 
member  banks.  In  Kansas  and  Oklahoma, 
reserve  requirements  are  approximately  the 
same for  member  and  nonmember  banks.  In 
Wyoming, state reserve requirements tend to be 
somewhat  higher  than  the  requirements  for 
Federal  Reserve  members,  especially  for  very 
small banks, due to the relatively high  reserve 
requirements on time and savings deposits and 
on the fust $10 million of demand deposits.  As 
For  reserve requirements in all 50 states, see  R. Alton 
Gilbert and Jean M. Lovati, "Bank  Reserve  Requirements 
and  Their  Enforcement:  A  Comparison  Across  States," 
Review,  Federal  Reserve  Bank  of St. Louis,  March 1978, 
pp. 22-32. 
Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City a result,  Wyoming has the highest proportion 
of  member banks (75 per cent as of  December 
31, 1977) in the nation. 
The availability of  a wide array of services in 
return for balances on deposit with  correspon- 
dents  increases  the  relative  disadvantage  of 
member banks in  most  Tenth  District states. 
Furthermore,  nonmember banks are relatively 
better  off  because  they  are  frequently  given 
immediate credit for transit checks deposited 
with correspondents, while the Federal Reserve 
delays granting credit for checks for up to two 
days, depending on the location of  the bank on 
which the check is drawn. l3 
The  generally  lower  level  of  cash  reserve 
requirements  for  nonmember  banks is  a 
development of  the past  15 years.  (See  Chart 
1.) Reserve holdings have declined  relative to 
assets for both member and nonmember banks. 
Holdings have dropped because reserve require- 
ments  have  been  reduced  and  because  time 
deposits,  which  have  lower  reserve  require- 
ments than do demand deposits, have become a 
more  important  source  of  bank  funds." 
However, the decline has been somewhat larger 
for nonmember than for  member  banks.  The 
greater  decline  for  nonmember  banks  is  not 
due  to  a  relatively  greater  increase  in  the 
importance  of  time  and  savings  deposits  for 
nonmembers;  it  is  due  instead  to  a  larger 
13 Although banks are given  immediate credit for checks 
deposited,  the  account  analysis  performed  by  the 
correspondent  will  give credit only for collected balances. 
Robert  E.  Knight, "Account  Analysis  in  Correspondent 
Banking,"  Monthly  Review.  Federal  Reserve  Bank  of 
Kansas City, March 1976, pp. 11-20. 
14 It has been estimated  that between February 1968 and 
February 1977, 55.6 per cent of the decline in the ratio of 
required reserves to deposits at member banks was due to 
changes  in  reserve  requirements  and  the  remainder  to 
changes  in  the  deposit  structure.  Thomas  D.  Simpson, 
"The Behavior of Member Bank  Required  Reserve  Ratios 
and the Effects of Board Action, 1968-77,"  Staff Paper No. 
97 (Washington, D.C.:  Board of Governors of the Federal 
Reserve System, July 1978), p. 20. 
reduction in reserve requirements for nonmem- 
bers than for members.'5 Table 2 illustrates the 
greater decline for nonmembers by showing the 
level of cash reserve requirements levied against 
the demand  deposits of  a  hypothetical  bank 
with exactly $25 million in demand deposits in 
1962 and in  1978. As can be seen, state reserve 
requirements declined sharply in many of  the 
Tenth  District states between  1962 and  1978. 
These declines result largely because states now 
allow  banks  to  use  Government securities to 
meet reserve requirements to a  greater  extent 
than in 1962. 
The  smaller  reduction  in  member  bank 
reserve requirements has contributed heavily to 
the decline in the share of Tenth District banks 
holding  membership  in  the  Federal  Reserve 
System from 42.3 per cent in  1962 to 36.3 per 
cent in 1978. Similarly, the share of total Tenth 
District bank deposits held  in  member banks 
declined from 74.9 per cent in 1%2 to 63.3 per 
cent  in  1978.  Additionally,  the  increase  in 
interest rates over  this period  has  meant  that 
the cost of  holding noninterest-bearing reserve 
balances  at  the  Federal  Reserve  has  in- 
creased.  l6 
DO STATE RESERVE REQUIREMENTS 
MATTER? 
Some observers have  argued  that state 
reserve requirements are so low  that they  are 
not  effective in  inducing banks to hold  more 
15 The decline in  the importance of  demand deposits  was 
similar  at  both  Tenth  District  member  and  nonmember 
banks over  this  period.  Demand  deposits  dropped  from 
72.6 per cent of  member bank deposits in 1962 to 42.5 per 
cent  in  1976.  At  nonmember  banks,  demand  deposits 
dropped from 66.3 per cent of total deposits in 1962 to 37.1 
per cent in 1976. 
16 See Carl M. Gambs and Robert  H.  Rasche, "Costs of 
Reserves and the Relative Size of Member and Nonmember 
Bank Demand Deposits,"  Journal of  Monetary Economics, 
4 (November 1978), pp. 715-33, for estimates of the relative 
importance of differential Federal Reserve and state reserve 
requirements and of increasing interest rates for the decline 
in Federal Reserve membership. 
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SOURCE: Derived from data for all Tenth District member banks and sample of nonmember banks. Individual 
state ratios were first computed and the District composite was then obtained by weighting by total deposits 
in each state. For a description of the sample of  nonmember banks,  see  Carl M. Gambs, "State Reserve 
Requirements and Bank Cash Assets," Research Working Paper 78-05, Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City, 
August 1978, pp. 10-11. 
cash  assets than they  would  hold  if  they were 
not  subject  to  reserve  requirements.  State 
reserve requirements can be said to be effective 
if a change in the level of required cash reserves 
leads to a  change in  the level  of  actual  cash 
reserves.  If a  $1 increase in  required  reserves 
leads to a $1 increase in actual cash reserves, 
the reserve requirement is  My  effective.  If the 
$1 increase in required reserves leads to an in- 
crease in  actual  reserves by  some amount less 
than  $1,  the  reserve  requirement  is  partly 
effective.  If  state  requirements  are  effective 
they provide some encouragement for banks to 
become  or  remain  members  of  the  Federal 
Reserve  System.  Moreover,  the  greater  the 
degree  of  effectiveness,  the  more  likely  that 
10  Federal Reserve of  Kansas City Table 2 
REQUIRED CASH RESERVES AS A 
PER CENT OF DEMAND DEPOSITS 
(A Bank with $25 Million 
in Demand Deposits) 
1962  1978  -  - 
Federal  Reserve  12.0  10.6 
State  Nonmembers: 
Colorado  0.0  0.0 
Kansas  12.5  10.6 
Missouri  15.0  5.3 
Nebraska  12.0  7.5 
New  Mexico  12.0  6  .O 
Oklahoma  15.0  10.6 
Wyoming  20 .O  10.0 
banks  will  choose  to  be  Federal  Reserve 
members. 
The effectiveness of  state  requirements also 
affects the extent to which the Federal Reserve 
can increase membership by  lowering member 
bank  reserve  requirements.  If  state  require- 
ments  are  ineffective,  the  existence  of  the 
requirements  does  not  cause  banks  to  hold 
more reserves, nor does it place any burden on 
the banks subject to the requirements. In such 
a  situation,  if  the  Federal  Reserve  reduces 
requirements to reduce the relative burden of 
membership, the state banking authority could 
not  make  nonmember  status  more  attractive 
correspondingly, as there would  be no burden 
of state reserve requirements to reduce. 
Empirical Evidence on the Effectiveness 
of  Reserve Requirements I' 
Some researchers have examined the ratio of 
actual to required reserves to ascertain whether 
l7  For a discussion of previous work  on the effectiveness of 
reserve requirements, see Gambs, "State Reserve  Require- 
ments and Bank  Cash Assets," pp. 3-8. 
or  not  a  state's  reserve  requirements  are 
effective.  If  this  ratio is  well  above 1.0,  it  is 
argued,  state  reserve  requirements  are  not 
effective  because  banks  are  holding  more 
reserves than  required.I8 The  logic  is  that if 
actual  reserves  are substantially  greater  than 
required reserves, the level  of  cash assets held 
must  be  determined  by  factors  other  than 
reserve requirements. Table 3 shows that for a 
sample  of  Tenth  District  nonmembers  the 
ratios of  actual  to  required  reserves  are 
generally  well  above  1.0.  From  these  ratios 
alone, it  might be  inferred that state  reserve 
requirements  in  the  Tenth  District  are  not 
effective.  However,  this  inference  is  not 
necessarily  valid.  Many  banks  may  want  to 
hold excess reserves because they prefer to be 
highly  liquid or  because  they  want  to ensure 
that  an  unexpected  deposit  oufflow  will  not 
leave  them  with  reserves  below  the  required 
level. 
Furthermore, even  though the average ratio 
may exceed 1.0, a substantial number of  banks 
may have a ratio near  1.O.I9  Table 3 shows that 
a  large portion of  Tenth  District  banks  have 
actual reserve ratios relatively close to 1.0, i.e., 
between 1.00  and  1.25.  Reserve  requirements 
may  be  effective for these banks, even if  they 
are not for all of  the banks in the sample.  A 
mixture  of  some  banks  with  partly  or  fully 
effective reserve requirements and others  with 
ineffective  reserve  requirements  would  make 
18 For an example of this approach, and for ratios similar 
to those in Table 3 for other states, see Board of Governors 
of the  Federal  Reserve  System,  "The  Burden  of  Federal 
Reserve Membership, NOW  Accounts, and the Payment of 
Interest on Reserves," Appendix A. 
l9 The existence of banks with a ratio of less than 1.0 does 
not necessarily mean that these banks were violating state 
reserve  requirements. It  may  reflect  the  fact  that  these 
ratios were calculated using data for only one day, instead 
of  over  the entire reserve  periods  because  data  were  not 
available to perform the latter computation. 
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RATIO OF CASH ASSETS TO REQUIRED CASH RESERVES 
(Per Cent of  Banks in 1976) 
New 
Ratlo  Kansas  Mlssourl  Nebraska  Mex~co  Oklahoma  Wyoming  - 
<I .OO  7.6  7.3  14.9  16.0  5.1  20.0 
1 .OO-1.10  3.3  5.5  6.4  0  .O  7.7  20.0 
1 .I  0-1.25  16.3  14.5  25.5  0.0  12.8  30.0 
1.25-1.50  22.8  21.8  14.9  0  .O  12.8  10.0 
1.50-2.00  20.7  41.8  19.1  10.0  35.9  10.0 
2.00-3.00  16.3  5.6  6.4  50.0  23.1  10.0 
3.00-4.00  10.9  3.6  0.0  30.0  2.6  0.0 
>4.00  2.2  0  .O  0.0  0.0  0.0  0  .O 
Average  1.83  1.57  1.45  2.59  1.70  1.30 
SOURCE: Calculated  for  a  sample  of  272 Tenth  District  banks.  For  a  description  of the  sam- 
ple,  see  Gambs,  "State  Reserve  Requirements and  Bank  Cash  Assets," pp.  10-11. 
the ratio for all banks in a state appear to be 
partly effective. 
The  effectiveness  of  state  reserve  require- 
ments in the Tenth District was also examined 
through the use of  linear regression analysis.'O 
The  examination,  which  considered  the  cash 
holdings  of  276  Tenth  District  nonmember 
banks over the 1962-76 period, concluded that 
state reserve requirements were partly effective. 
Over  the  period  studied,  a  $1  increase  in 
required reserves, on an average, led to a $0.39 
increase  in  cash  asset  holdings.  Bank  cash 
holdings  were  also  found  to  be  affected  by 
several  variables  other  than  reserve  require- 
ments.  The  variables  include  bank  size,  the 
ratio of  demand  deposits to total assets,  and 
interest rates. 
The results  of  the above examination imply 
that state reserve requirements have an indirect 
role in facilitating monetary control. Banks are 
less likely to leave the Federal Reserve System 
20 Gambs, "State Reserve  Requirements and  Bank  Cash 
Assets." 
when there are state reserve requirements than 
if  there  were  none.  If  there  were  no  state 
reserve requirements,  there would  be  a  much 
greater  reduction  in  the  burden  of  reserve 
requirements  when  banks  changed  from 
member to nonmember status than is  now  the 
case. 
21 The equation estimated by  multiple regression analysis 
was: 
VDFITA = 0.01 21 + 1  1.745 l/TA  + 0.393  CR/TA 
(1.1  9)  (3.92)  (8.09) 
276 
+ 0.1 583  DD/TA -  0.001 7 RTB + C aiBDi 





R~  = ,626  D.W. = 1.86  n = 4080 
Where:  VDF = Vault cash and due from banks 
TA = Total assets 
CR = Required cash reserves 
DD = Total demand deposits 
RTB = The rate on 3-month Treasury bills 
BDi = The I-th bank dummy variable 
The numbers in parentheses are t values. 
Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City This finding has implications for the impact 
of  changes  in  member  bank  reserve  require- 
ments  on  the  burden  of  Federal  Reserve 
membership. In brief, the burden depends on 
the  degree  that  changes  in  member  and 
nonmember bank reserve requirements induce 
the two types of banks to change their holdings 
of  assets.  For  example,  suppose  reserve 
requirements  for  member  and  nonmember 
banks  are  reduced  by  the  same  amount.  If 
member bank requirements are fully effective, 
but  nonmember  bank  requirements  are  not 
effective,  the  relative  burden  of  membership 
will be reduced, as there will  be a reduction in 
the cash asset holdings of members, but not of 
nonmembers.  On  the  other  hand,  if  both 
member and nonmember reserve requirements 
are fully effective, equal reductions in  reserve 
requirements will  leave the relative  burden of 
membership unchanged-that is, state regula- 
tors  can  completely  offset  the  effect  of  the 
member  bank  reserve  reduction  on  the 
desirability  of  membership.  The  results  cited 
here suggest that nonmember requirements are 
partly effective, so simultaneous reductions in 
member  and  nonmember  requirements  would 
reduce the relative burden of  member  banks, 
but not by as much as if  nonmember require- 
ments were  ineffective. Thus,  state regulators 
could not offset the reduced burden of member 
banks unless  they  lowered  their  requirements 
more than did the Federal Reserve. 
In those states where all or part of the reserve 
requirements can be  met with  interest-bearing 
assets,  it  would  be  particularly  difficult  for 
state regulators to offset  Federal  Reserve 
reductions  of  member  bank  reserve  require- 
ments.  If,  for  example,  a  state's  nonmember 
banks were  allowed  to meet  one-half  of  their 
reserve requirements with interest-bearing 
assets, the state would have to lower its reserve 
requirements two  percentage  points  for  every 
one percentage  point reduction  in the Federal 
Reserve  reserve  requirement  to get  the  same 
reduction in the level of cash requirements. 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
Federal  Reserve  and  state  reserve  require- 
ments  serve  very  different  purposes.  Federal 
Reserve  requirements  are  used  for  monetary 
control  purposes  and can also be viewed  as a 
tax on member  banks, but state requirements 
directly serve  neither of  these functions.  State 
requirements do play an indirect  role,  in that 
they tend to.make Federal Reserve membership 
more  attractive  than  if  states  did  not  impose 
requirements.  Neither  Federal  Reserve  nor 
state  reserve  requirements  play  an important 
function in  ensuring  bank  liquidity  or safety, 
although state regulators may find  the degree 
to which banks comply with requirements to be 
a useful guide to the general soundness of bank 
operations. 
Federal Reserve requirements are much more 
burdensome  than  state requirements  because 
they  are higher  and  must  be  met  with  vault 
cash and deposits with Federal Reserve Banks, 
while  state  requirements  can  be  met  with 
deposits with correspondents (including  uncol- 
lected funds in many cases) and in some cases 
with  interest-bearing  securities.  While  many 
banks hold more reserve assets than required to 
meet  reserve  requirements,  evidence  suggests 
that state reserve requirements,  at least in the 
Tenth District, are partly effective. Thus, they 
are  probably  responsible  for  Federal  Res~rve 
membership being higher  than it would  be in 
the absence of state reserve requirements. 
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